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Abstract
Background: The prevalence of self-reported preventive behaviors in response to an anticipated
local human-to-human H5N1 transmission outbreak and factors associated with such behaviors
have not been examined.
Methods: A random, anonymous, cross-sectional telephone survey of 503 Hong Kong Chinese
adults.
Results: The public in Hong Kong is likely to adopt self-protective behaviors (e.g., wearing face
mask in public venues (73.8%), increasing the frequency of handwashing (86.7%)) and behaviors that
protect others (e.g., wearing face masks when experiencing influenza-like illness (ILI, 92.4%),
immediately seeking medical consultation (94.2%), making declarations when crossing the border
with ILI (87.1%), complying to quarantine policies (88.3%)). Multivariate analyses indicated that
factors related to age, full-time employment, perceived susceptibility, perceived efficacy of
preventive measures, perceived higher fatality as compared to SARS, perceived chance of a major
local outbreak, and being worried about self/family members contracting the virus were significantly
associated with the inclination to adopt self-protective measures. Similar analyses showed that
education level, variables related to perceived efficacy, perceived major local outbreak and such
were significantly associated with various behaviors directed towards protecting others.
Conclusion: In the event of a human-to-human H5N1 outbreak, the public in Hong Kong is likely
to adopt preventive measures that may help contain the spread of the virus in the community.
Background
As of December 7, 2006, bird-to-bird transmission of the
H5N1 virus have been reported in over 50 countries [1],
totaling 274 reported cases of bird-to-human transmis-
sion, with 167 resulting deaths [2]. From May to Decem-
ber, 1997, the first 18 cases of human H5N1 were
reported in Hong Kong, resulting in 6 fatalities [2]. While
human-to-human transmissions are considered rare
occurrences [3,4], experts are concerned that a pandemic
may occur via human-to-human transmissions [5,6], and
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worldwide [7].
During the SARS epidemic, preventive measures were
commonly practiced [8] and a number of these behaviors
[9-11] have been sustained by a large proportion of the
public even after the SARS epidemic subsided in Hong
Kong [12]. Preventive behaviors such as face mask use and
handwashing have been suggested to be effective in the
control of the SARS epidemic [9]. Understanding the cor-
relates of these behavioral changes would facilitate formu-
lation of policies and campaigns to promote appropriate
behavioral responses in the event of a human-to-human
H5N1 outbreak.
This study investigated the prevalence of self-reported pre-
ventive behaviors in response to a hypothetical local out-
break of human-to-human H5N1 transmission. These
behaviors included both self-protective measures as well
and those protecting others from contracting the virus.
Factors associated with these behaviors were investigated.
Methods
Study population
The study population was comprised of male and female
Hong Kong Chinese adults aged 18–60 years. An anony-
mous cross-sectional telephone survey using a structured
questionnaire was conducted in November 2005 (n =
503). Table 1 summarizes the background characteristics
of the respondents. Random telephone numbers were
selected from up-to-date telephone directories. Telephone
surveys have been used in a number of SARS and avian
influenza studies [11-14]. Telephone calls were made by
trained interviewers from 6:30 PM to 10:00 PM each night
to avoid over-representation of unemployed persons. For
unanswered calls, at least 3 other independent calls were
made. The household member whose birthday was clos-
est to the date of the interview was invited to join the
study. Verbal informed consent was obtained from the
respondents and ethics approval was obtained from the
Ethics Committee of the Chinese University of Hong
Kong. The response rate, defined as the number of com-
pleted interviews divided by the number of eligible house-
holds, was approximately 57%.
Measurements
Respondents were asked how likely they would be to
adopt the following preventive behaviors if a local
human-to-human H5N1 outbreak (defined as "if 2–3
new human-to-human transmission of H5N1 cases were
to be reported in Hong Kong") were to occur: face mask
use in public venues, increased frequency of handwash-
ing, avoidance of eating poultry, declaration of influenza-
like illness (ILI) symptoms at border health checkpoints,
the seeking of medical consultation immediately with the
onset of a fever, face mask use in public venues when hav-
ing ILI symptoms and compliance with any quarantine
policies. Responses were recoded into 2 categories (yes or
no) from a 5-point Likert scale.
Respondents were asked about perceptions related to
human-to-human H5N1 transmission, including per-
ceived modes of transmission (whether human-to-human
transmission of the H5N1 virus could occur via respira-
tory droplets, bodily contact, contaminated objects, eat-
ing well-cooked poultry), perceived susceptibility to
H5N1 in different groups of people (self, family mem-
bers, children, adults, older people, health care workers,
food handlers, food vendors and the general public), per-
ceived chance of having a major outbreak in Hong Kong
Table 1: Background characteristics of the respondents (n = 503)
Male Female All
(n = 234) (n = 269) (n = 503)
Col% Col% Col%
Age group
18 – 24 15.8 16.0 15.9
25 – 34 19.7 22.3 21.1
35 – 44 26.1 27.5 26.8
45 – 60 38.5 34.2 36.2
Education level
Matriculated or below 61.8 68.8 65.5
College/university or above 38.2 31.2 34.5
Marital status
Never married 40.2 34.9 37.4
Ever married 59.8 65.1 62.6
Employment status
Not employed full-time 22.2 54.6 39.6
Employed full-time 77.8 45.4 60.4Page 2 of 12
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prevention measures (quarantine of infected people, face
mask use in public venues, frequent handwashing, home
disinfection, mass extermination of poultry). Respond-
ents were also asked their perceptions of the current avail-
ability of effective treatments, whether they believed
health outcomes would be worse than those of SARS
(higher fatality and lower treatment efficacy) and the
degree of concern they had about oneself or one's family
contracting the virus if 2–3 new human-to-human H5N1
were to be reported in Hong Kong.
Statistical methods
Univariate odds ratios of the associations between the
studied perception variables and individual studied pre-
ventive behaviors were derived. Variables that were signif-
icant in the univariate analyses were further analyzed
using multivariate logistic regression analyses. Statistical
significance was set at p = 0.05 and SPSS software version
12.0.0 (SPSS Inc, Chicago, IL, 2003) was used for data
analyses.
Results
Prevalence of protective behaviors in the event of a human 
H5N1 outbreak in Hong Kong
The majority would adopt self-protecting behaviors such
as wearing face mask in public venues (73.8%), increasing
frequency of handwashing (86.7%), avoiding eating poul-
try (63.8%), wearing face mask in public venues when
having ILI symptoms (92.4%), seeing a doctor immedi-
ately when having a fever (94.2%), making declarations at
border health checkpoints when traveling with ILI
(87.1%), and full compliance with any quarantine poli-
cies (88.3%). Gender and educational differences were, in
general, non-significant, whereas some significant age dif-
ferences were noted. Overall, 41.6% of the respondents
would practice all 7 types of protective behaviors (Table
2).
Perceptions related to anticipated human-to-human 
H5N1 outbreak in Hong Kong
The majority of the respondents believed that various
groups of people would be highly susceptible to the virus.
Of the respondents, 26.8% believed themselves and
33.6% believed their family members or the general pub-
lic to be highly susceptible (Table 3). Over 90% of the
respondents perceived "high"or "very high" efficacy in
various preventive practices, and 71.8% perceived mass
extermination of poultry as an efficacious measure. Of the
respondents, 85.7%, 60.8%, 48.3% and 24.9%, respec-
tively, believed that respiratory droplets, contaminated
objects, body contacts and eating well-cooked poultry to
be transmission modes of the virus (Table 3).
With regard to the impact of the disease, 33% believed
that there would be a major human-to-human H5N1 out-
break in Hong Kong in the coming year; 40.2% believed
that it would have higher fatality as compared to SARS
and 53.7% would be very worried about oneself or one's
family members contracting the virus if an outbreak were
to occur. Further, half of the respondents (50.5%)
believed that effective drugs are now unavailable, fewer
Table 2: Anticipated health-related behavioral responses if 2 to 3 new human-to-human H5N1 cases were to be reported in Hong 
Kong
Gender Age group Education level All
Male Female 18 – 34 35 – 60 ≤Matriculated ≥University
(% Likely/very likely)a Col% Col% p Col% Col% p Col% Col% p Col%
Face mask use in public venues 75.6 72.1 .37 65.1 78.9 <.01 75.4 70.5 .24 73.8
Increased frequency of handwashing 87.2 86.2 .76 81.7 89.6 .01 88.4 83.8 .14 86.7
Avoidance of eating poultry 61.1 66.2 .24 55.9 68.5 <.01 63.8 63.6 .96 63.8
Full compliance with any quarantine policies 86.8 89.6 .32 85.5 89.9 .14 87.5 89.6 .50 88.3
Face mask use in public venues if having ILI symptoms 90.6 94.1 .14 91.4 93.1 .50 90.6 96.0 .03 92.4
Declaration of ILI symptoms at border health checkpoints 89.3 85.1 .16 84.9 88.3 .28 86.3 88.4 .50 87.1
Seeking of medical consultation immediately with the onset of a 
fever
94.4 94.1 .85 95.2 93.7 .50 94.2 94.2 1.00 94.2
Total number of the above anticipated behaviors
None 0.4 0.4 .06 1.1 0.0 .01 0.6 0.0 .29 0.4
1 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.3 0.6 0.0 0.4
2 1.7 1.9 3.2 0.9 2.1 1.2 1.8
3 6.4 3.0 4.8 4.4 4.0 5.8 4.6
4 2.6 7.8 6.5 4.7 4.0 8.1 5.4
5 16.7 18.6 20.4 16.1 17.9 17.3 17.7
6 34.2 26.0 33.9 27.4 31.6 26.0 29.8
All 7 37.6 42.0 29.6 46.1 39.2 41.6 40.0
a Answer options include 'very likely', 'likely', 'unlikely', 'very unlikely' and 'not certain'.Page 3 of 12
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Table 3: Perceptions related human-to-human H5N1 infection
Gender Age group Education level All
Male Female 18 – 34 35 – 60 ≤Matriculated ≥University
Col% Col% OR Col% Col% OR Col% Col% OR Col%
Perceived modes of transmission of human-to-human 
H5N1(%Yes)
Respiratory droplets 85.0 86.2 ns 84.9 86.1 ns 87.2 82.7 ns 85.7
Bodily contact 50.4 46.5 ns 44.6 50.5 ns 47.1 50.3 ns 48.3
Objects contaminated with the virus 61.1 60.6 ns 63.4 59.3 ns 61.7 59.0 ns 60.8
Eating well-cooked poultry 22.2 27.1 ns 27.4 23.3 ns 24.0 26.6 ns 24.9
No. of items with "yes" responses in the above 4 items
0 – 2 60.3 59.9 ns 60.2 59.9 ns 59.6 61.3 ns 60.0
3 – 4 39.7 40.1 39.8 40.1 40.4 38.7 40.0
Perceived impacts of human-to-human H5N1
% Fatality rate worse than that of SARS 43.6 37.2 ns 36.0 42.6 ns 39.8 41.0 ns 40.2
% Efficacy of treatments worse than that of SARS 16.2 10.0 0.58* 12.4 13.2 ns 13.4 12.1 ns 12.9
% Perceived high/very high chance to have a major human-to-
human H5N1 outbreak in Hong Kong
30.8 34.9 36.0 31.2 ns 33.7 31.2 ns 33.0
% Worry about oneself/family members contracting the virusa 47.4 59.1 1.60** 53.8 53.6 ns 54.1 53.2 ns 53.7
% Perceiving no effective drugs currently available 50.4 50.6 ns 54.8 47.9 ns 49.2 53.2 ns 50.5
Perceived susceptibility to H5N1 infection(% Likely/very 
likely)
Oneself or one's family members 27.4 26.4 ns 30.1 24.9 ns 22.2 35.8 1.
96
**
26.8
Older people 88.9 91.1 ns 93.5 88.0 0.
51
*
90.0 90.8 ns 90.1
Adults 49.6 46.8 ns 45.7 49.5 ns 44.7 54.9 1.
51
*
48.1
Children 84.6 86.2 ns 88.2 83.9 ns 85.7 85.5 ns 85.5
Health care workers 76.9 81.0 ns 83.9 76.3 0.
62
*
76.6 83.8 ns 79.1
Food sellers 82.9 87.4 ns 94.1 80.1 0.
25
**
*
80.9 94.2 3.
86
**
*
85.3
Food handlers 63.7 67.7 ns 74.2 60.9 0.
54
**
63.2 71.1 ns 65.8
The general public 35.9 31.6 ns 34.4 33.1 ns 30.4 39.9 1.
52
*
33.6
No. of items with "likely/very likely" responses in the above 8 
items
0 – 6 72.2 77.3 ns 71.5 77.0 ns 79.3 66.5 1.
94
**
75.0
7 – 8 27.8 22.7 28.5 23.0 20.7 33.5 25.0
Perceived efficacy of prevention measures(% High/very 
high)
Quarantine of the infected people 96.6 92.9 ns 94.1 95.0 ns 93.6 96.5 ns 94.6
Face mask use in public venues 90.2 90.7 ns 88.2 91.8 ns 91.2 89.6 ns 90.5
Frequent handwashing 93.2 94.1 ns 89.2 96.2 3.
06
**
94.2 93.1 ns 93.6
Home disinfections 90.2 90.3 ns 93.5 88.3 ns 90.6 90.2 ns 90.3
Mass extermination of poultry 73.9 69.9 ns 72.6 71.3 ns 71.4 72.8 ns 71.8
No. of items with "high/very high" responses in the above 5 
items
0 – 3 11.1 13.4 ns 14.0 11.4 ns 11.2 13.9 ns 12.3
4 28.6 32.0 29.6 30.9 31.0 29.5 30.4
5 60.3 54.6 56.5 57.7 57.8 56.6 57.3
a Would worry that it is likely/very likely for oneself or one's family members to contract H5N1 (if 2–3 new cases were to be reported in Hong Kong.
OR = Univariate odds ratio. *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001. ns = not significant.
BMC Infectious Diseases 2007, 7:18 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2334/7/18(12.9%) thought that the efficacy of treatment for this dis-
ease would be worse that that of SARS (Table 3).
Factors predicting self-protecting behaviors if a local 
human-to-human H5N1 outbreak occurs
Certain factors were significantly associated with self-pro-
tective behaviors at the multivariate level. These include
older age, full time employment, higher degree of per-
ceived susceptibility, perceived efficacy of using face
masks in preventing the disease, higher degree of per-
ceived efficacy of the preventive measures, perceived
higher fatality of H5N1 than SARS, anticipation of risk of
a major outbreak in Hong Kong in the coming year, and
concern about oneself/one's family in contracting the
virus (OR = 1.86 to 2.78, p < 0.05, Table 4). Perceived effi-
cacy related to mask use, handwashing and mass extermi-
nation of poultry, perceived higher fatality rate as
compared to SARS and worry about oneself/one's family
in contracting the virus were significant in the multivari-
ate analysis in predicting perceived higher frequency of
handwashing (OR = 1.94 to 7.76, p < 0.05, Table 4). Hav-
ing ever been married, perceived susceptibility for food
handlers, perceived efficacy of face mask use, perception
that well-cooked poultry is a mode of transmission and
perceived major outbreak in Hong Kong were multivari-
ately predictive of avoidance of eating poultry (OR = 1.58
to 2.63, p < 0.05, Table 4).
Factors predicting behaviors protecting others if an 
outbreak occurs
Multivariate results in Table 5 indicate education level,
perceived efficacy related to face mask and perceived
major outbreak in Hong Kong in the next year were pre-
dictive of anticipated use of face mask in public venues
when having ILI symptoms (OR = 2.71 to 8.03, Table 5);
perceived likelihood of a major outbreak in Hong Kong in
the next year and perceived efficacy of disinfection of liv-
ing quarters were multivariately associated with declaring
ILI symptoms at cross-border checkpoints (OR = 3.09 and
2.87, respectively); perceived efficacy of mass extermina-
tion of poultry was the only factor predicting immediate
doctor consultation when having fever (OR = 2.93). Ever-
married status, perceived susceptibility related to chil-
dren, perceived efficacy of face mask use were multivari-
ately associated with intended full compliance with any
quarantine policies (OR = 2.02 to 3.75).
Discussion
These data indicate that the majority of the Hong Kong
general public would adopt preventive measures, even in
the event of 2–3 reported human-to-human H5N1 trans-
missions in Hong Kong. During the SARS epidemic, the
prevalence of similar preventive behaviors increased
sharply in the initial weeks of the outbreak [13].
Currently, we estimate that reasonably half of the general
population is washing their hands over 10 times a day
(unpublished data). An even higher frequency of hand-
washing is expected if the anticipated outbreak occurs.
This is consistent with the local government campaigns
for promoting handwashing [15]. Handwashing has been
efficacious in preventing influenza [16,17] and SARS [9]
and the vast majority of the respondents (94%) believed
that it would be efficacious in preventing human-to-
human avian influenza. Such a belief was, in turn, associ-
ated with anticipated higher frequency of handwashing.
Handwashing may have become a commonly accepted
means of preventing infectious respiratory diseases.
Approximately 90% of the general population reported
face mask use in public venues during the peak of the
SARS epidemic [12,13]. The majority of the respondents
would do so if there was a human-to-human H5N1 out-
break in Hong Kong. Many believed that face mask use in
public venues was an efficacious method of human-to-
human H5N1 prevention. However, while 87.1% of the
respondents reported that they would report ILI symp-
toms at health checkpoints as required at times of a
human-to-human H5N1 outbreak, 70.8% of the respond-
ents did not do so during the period of April 2003 to Jan-
uary 2004 (during and shortly after the SARS epidemic)
(unpublished data) [8]. Studies have demonstrated the
limited effectiveness of such measures implemented dur-
ing the SARS epidemic [18,19]. It is shown that about
90% of the general population with ILI symptoms during
the SARS epidemic were wearing face masks [13], which is
comparable to the results of this study showing that about
92% would wear face masks. The similarities between var-
ious public health responses related to SARS and avian
influenza are reported and it is speculated that the public
is modeling their responses to avian influenza outbreak to
those of the SARS epidemic.
During the SARS epidemic, the reported prevalence of face
mask use when having ILI while traveling abroad was not
very high, indicating that a substantial proportion of the
general population was not practicing behaviors directed
towards protecting others [10]. This is in contrast to the
results of this study, which noted very high proportion of
respondents stating their intent to adopt of behaviors
directed towards protecting others. The perceived severity
of H5N1 may elicit more behaviors directed at protecting
others.
Quarantine was an effective means contributing to the
control of SARS [20,21] but a comparatively low percent-
age of the respondents (73.9%) believed quarantine to be
an effective public health measure for control of avian
influenza, and 11.7% of the respondents would not fully
comply with government quarantine policies indicates
there is still a need for education. As perceived efficacy wasPage 5 of 12
(page number not for citation purposes)
BMC Infectious Diseases 2007, 7:18 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2334/7/18Table 4: Factors associated with anticipated preventive behaviors protecting oneself if 2 to 3 new human-to-human H5N1 cases were 
to be reported in Hong Kong
Face mask use in public venues Increased frequency of handwashing Avoidance of eating poultry
Row% ORu ORm Row% ORu ORm Row% ORu ORm
Background characteristics
Age groups
18 – 34 65.1 1.00 1.00 81.7 1.00 ns 55.9 1.00 ns
35 – 60 78.9 2.00** 2.38*** 89.6 1.93* 68.5 1.71**
Marital status
Never married 64.9 1.00 ns 83.0 1.00 ns 55.3 1.00 1.00
Ever married 79.0 2.04** 88.9 1.64~ 68.9 1.79** 2.11***
Employment status
Not employed full-time 65.8 1.00 1.00 86.4 ns --- 61.3 ns ---
Employed full-time 78.9 1.95** 2.07** 86.8 65.5
Perceived modes of transmission of human-to-human 
H5N1:
Respiratory droplets
No/not certain 62.5 1.00 ns 77.8 1.00 ns 61.1 ns ---
Yes 75.6 1.86* 88.2 2.13* 64.3
Bodily contact
No/not certain 70.0 1.00 ns 86.2 ns --- 61.2 ns ---
Yes 77.8 1.50* 87.2 66.7
Objects contaminated with the virus
No/not certain 72.1 ns --- 82.7 1.00 ns 62.4 ns ---
Yes 74.8 89.2 1.73* 64.7
Eating well-cooked poultry
No/not certain 73.8 ns --- 86.2 ns --- 60.3 1.00 1.00
Yes 73.6 88.0 74.4 1.91** 1.92**
No. of items with "yes" responses in the above 4 
items
0 – 2 68.9 1.00 ns 83.8 1.00 ns 60.6 1.00 ns
3 – 4 81.1 1.94** 91.0 1.97* 68.7 1.42~
Perceived impacts of human-to-human H5N1
Fatality rate
Same as SARS/better than SARS/not certain 67.1 1.00 1.00 83.1 1.00 1.00 60.8 1.00 ns
Worse than SARS 83.7 2.51*** 1.86* 92.1 2.37** 1.94* 68.3 1.39~
Efficacy of treatment
Same as SARS/better than SARS/not certain 71.5 1.00 ns 85.6 1.00 ns 62.8 ns ---
Worse than SARS 89.2 3.31** 93.8 2.56~ 70.8
Perceived chance to have a major human-to-
human H5N1 outbreak in Hong Kong
Low/very low chance/not certain 68.5 1.00 1.00 85.2 ns --- 59.9 1.00 1.00
High/very high chance 84.3 2.47*** 2.23** 89.8 71.7 1.69* 1.58*
Worry about oneself/family members contract-
ing the virusa
Unlikely/very unlikely/not certain 63.9 1.00 1.00 81.5 1.00 1.00 57.5 1.00 ns
Likely/very likely 82.2 2.61*** 2.11** 91.1 2.32** 2.20** 69.3 1.67**
No effective drugs currently available
Disagree/not certain 68.7 1.00 ns 83.5 1.00 ns 62.7 ns ---
Agree 78.7 1.69* 89.8 1.73* 65.0
Perceived susceptibility to H5N1 infection
Oneself or one's family
Unlikely/very unlikely/not certain 69.3 1.00 ns 86.7 ns --- 62.5 ns ---Page 6 of 12
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Older people
Unlikely/very unlikely/not certain 64.0 ns --- 88.0 ns --- 56.0 ns ---
Likely/very likely 74.8 86.5 64.7
Adults
Unlikely/very unlikely/not certain 68.6 1.00 ns 84.3 ns --- 63.6 ns ---
Likely/very likely 79.3 1.76** 89.3 64.0
Children
Unlikely/very unlikely/not certain 61.6 1.00 ns 82.2 ns --- 67.1 ns ---
Likely/very likely 75.8 1.95* 87.4 63.3
Health care workers
Unlikely/very unlikely/not certain 63.8 1.00 ns 84.8 ns --- 64.8 ns ---
Likely/very likely 76.4 1.83* 87.2 63.6
Food sellers
Unlikely/very unlikely/not certain 68.9 ns --- 81.1 ns --- 45.9 1.00 1.00
Likely/very likely 74.6 87.6 66.9 2.38** 2.63***
Food dealers
Unlikely/very unlikely/not certain 68.6 1.00 ns 86.0 ns --- 60.5 ns ---
Likely/very likely 76.4 1.48~ 87.0 65.6
The general public
Unlikely/very unlikely/not certain 68.9 1.00 ns 86.2 ns --- 61.7 ns ---
Likely/very likely 83.4 2.28** 87.6 68.0
No. of items with "likely/very likely" responses 
in the above 8 items
0 – 6 69.0 1.00 1.00 86.2 ns --- 62.3 ns ---
7 – 8 88.1 3.33*** 2.54** 88.1 68.3
Perceived efficacy of prevention measures
Quarantine of the infected people
Low/very low/not certain 70.4 ns --- 88.9 ns --- 66.7 ns ---
High/very high 73.9 86.6 63.7
Face mask use in public venues
Low/very low/not certain 37.5 1.00 1.00 68.8 1.00 1.00 47.9 1.00 1.00
High/very high 77.6 5.77*** 2.78* 88.6 3.52*** 2.21* 65.5 2.06* 1.87*
Frequent handwashing
Low/very low/not certain 68.8 ns --- 50.0 1.00 1.00 71.9 ns ---
High/very high 74.1 89.2 8.24*** 7.76*** 63.3
Home disinfection
Low/very low/not certain 63.3 1.00 ns 75.5 1.00 ns 63.3 ns ---
High/very high 74.9 1.73~ 87.9 2.35* 63.9
Mass extermination of poultry
Low/very low/not certain 66.9 1.00 ns 78.9 1.00 1.00 56.3 1.00 ns
High/very high 76.5 1.61* 89.8 2.35** 2.12* 66.8 1.56*
No. of items with "high/very high chance" 
responses in the above 5 items
0 – 3 46.8 1.00 1.00 69.4 1.00 ns 61.3 ns ---
4 – 5 77.6 3.93*** 2.75** 89.1 3.62*** 64.2
a Would worry that it is likely/very likely for oneself or one's family members to contract H5N1 (if 2–3 new cases were to be reported in Hong 
Kong. Gender and education level were not associated with any of the 3 dependent variables and were hence not tabulated.
ORU = Univariate odds ratio.
ORm = Odds ratios obtained from multivariate stepwise logistic regression using univariately significant (including marginally significant) variables as 
candidate variables.
~ 0.5 < p < 0.1; *p < 0.5; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.
ns = not significant.
--- univariately non-significant and was not considered in the multivariate stepwise logistic regression analysis.
Table 4: Factors associated with anticipated preventive behaviors protecting oneself if 2 to 3 new human-to-human H5N1 cases were 
to be reported in Hong Kong (Continued)Page 7 of 12
(page number not for citation purposes)
BMC Infectious Diseases 2007, 7:18 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2334/7/18Table 5: Factors associated with anticipated preventive behaviors to protect others if 2 to 3 new human-to-human H5N1 cases were to 
be reported in Hong Kong
Full compliance with 
any quarantine 
policies
Face mask use in 
public venues if 
having ILI symptoms
Declaration of ILI 
symptoms at 
border health 
checkpoints
Seeking of medical 
consultation 
immediately with 
the onset of a fever
Row% ORu ORm Row% ORu ORm Row% ORu ORm Row% ORu ORm
Background characteristics
Education level
≤ Matriculated 87.5 ns --- 90.6 1.00 1.00 86.3 ns --- 94.2 ns ---
≥ University 89.6 96.0 2.47* 2.99* 88.4 94.2
Marital status
Never married 83.5 1.00 1.00 91.0 ns --- 84.6 ns --- 94.1 ns ---
Ever married 91.1 2.02* 2.02* 93.3 88.6 94.3
Employment status
Not employed full-time 87.4 ns --- 88.9 1.00 ns 86.4 ns --- 92.0 1.00 ns
Employed full-time 88.8 94.7 2.24* 87.5 95.7 1.96~
Perceived modes of transmission of human-to-human H5N1:
Respiratory droplets
No/not certain 79.2 1.00 ns 87.5 1.00 ns 90.3 ns --- 95.8 ns ---
Yes 89.8 2.32* 93.3 1.98~ 86.5 94.0
Bodily contact
No/not certain 86.9 ns --- 91.9 ns --- 89.2 ns --- 93.8 ns ---
Yes 89.7 93.0 84.8 94.7
Objects contaminated with the virus
No/not certain 88.8 ns --- 91.4 ns --- 86.3 ns --- 93.4 ns ---
Yes 87.9 93.1 87.6 94.8
Eating well-cooked poultry
No/not certain 88.4 ns --- 91.8 ns --- 86.0 ns --- 93.9 ns ---
Yes 88.0 94.4 90.4 95.2
No. of items with "yes" responses in the above 4 items
0 – 2 87.7 ns --- 90.4 1.00 ns 87.1 ns --- 93.4 ns ---
3 – 4 89.1 95.5 2.27* 87.1 95.5
Perceived impacts of human-to-human H5N1
Perceived chance to have a major human-to-human H5N1 
outbreak in Hong Kong
Low/very low chance/not certain 86.6 ns --- 90.5 1.00 1.00 83.7 1.00 1.00 93.2 ns ---
High/very high chance 91.6 96.4 2.80* 2.71* 94.0 3.04
**
3.09
**
96.4
Worry about oneself/family members contracting the virusa
Unlikely/very unlikely/not certain 87.1 ns --- 89.7 1.00 ns 86.7 ns --- 92.7 ns ---
Likely/very likely 89.3 94.8 2.10* 87.4 95.6
No effective drugs currently available
Disagree/not certain 85.5 1.00 ns 91.6 ns --- 83.9 1.00 ns 92.8 ns ---
Agree 90.9 1.70~ 93.3 90.2 1.75
*
95.7
Perceived susceptibility to H5N1 infection
Oneself or one's family 87.2 ns --- 91.3 ns --- 85.3 1.00 ns 93.2 ns ---
Unlikely/very unlikely/not certain 91.1 95.6 91.9 1.94
~
97.0
Likely/very likely
Older people
Unlikely/very unlikely/not certain 78.0 1.00 ns 90.0 ns --- 86.0 ns --- 90.0 ns ---
Likely/very likely 89.4 2.38* 92.7 87.2 94.7Page 8 of 12
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Unlikely/very unlikely/not certain 87.0 ns --- 91.6 ns --- 86.6 ns --- 94.6 ns ---
Likely/very likely 89.7 93.4 87.6 93.8
Children
Unlikely/very unlikely/not certain 78.1 1.00 1.00 90.4 ns --- 86.3 ns --- 91.8 ns ---
Likely/very likely 90.0 2.53*
*
2.50*
*
92.8 87.2 94.7
Health care workers
Unlikely/very unlikely/not certain 83.8 ns --- 91.4 ns --- 86.7 ns --- 93.3 ns ---
Likely/very likely 89.4 92.7 87.2 94.5
Food sellers
Unlikely/very unlikely/not certain 87.8 ns --- 85.1 1.00 ns 82.4 ns --- 89.2 1.00 ns
Likely/very likely 88.3 93.7 2.60* 87.9 95.1 2.36
*
Food dealers
Unlikely/very unlikely/not certain 88.4 ns --- 88.4 1.00 ns 84.3 ns --- 94.2 ns ---
Likely/very likely 88.2 94.6 2.29* 88.5 94.3
The general public
Unlikely/very unlikely/not certain 86.2 1.00 ns 91.6 ns --- 85.6 ns --- 94.3 ns ---
Likely/very likely 92.3 1.92* 94.1 89.9 94.1
No. of items with "likely/very likely" responses in the above 
8 items
0 – 6 86.7 1.00 ns 91.2 1.00 ns 85.7 ns --- 93.9 ns ---
7 – 8 92.9 1.99~ 96.0 2.32~ 91.3 95.2
Efficacy of prevention measures
Quarantine of the infected people
Low/very low/not certain 74.1 1.00 ns 81.5 1.00 ns 81.5 ns --- 92.6 ns ---
High/very high 89.1 2.85* 93.1 3.05* 87.4 94.3
Face mask use in public venues
Low/very low/not certain 70.8 1.00 1.00 70.8 1.00 1.00 75.0 1.00 ns 87.5 1.00 ns
High/very high 90.1 3.75*
**
3.31*
*
94.7 7.40*
**
8.03*
**
88.4 2.53
*
94.9 2.68
*
Frequent handwashing
Low/very low/not certain 81.3 ns --- 84.4 1.00 --- 78.1 ns --- 87.5 ns ---
High/very high 88.7 93.0 2.46~ 87.7 94.7
Home disinfection
Low/very low/not certain 85.7 ns --- 87.8 ns --- 73.5 1.00 1.00 91.8 ns ---
High/very high 88.5 93.0 88.5 2.79
**
2.87
**
94.5
Mass extermination of poultry
Low/very low/not certain 84.5 ns --- 90.1 ns --- 88.7 ns --- 89.4 1.00 1.00
High/very high 89.8 93.4 86.4 96.1 2.93
**
2.93
**
No. of items with "high/very high chance" responses in the 
above 5 items
0 – 3 77.4 1.00 ns 80.6 1.00 ns 77.4 1.00 ns 88.7 1.00 ns
4 – 5 89.8 2.57*
*
94.1 3.83*
**
88.4 2.23
*
95.0 2.42~
a Would worry that it is likely/very likely for oneself or one's family members to contract H5N1 (if 2–3 new cases were to be reported in Hong 
Kong. Gender, age group, and perception that the impacts of human-to-human H5N1 would be worse than that of SARS in terms of fatality rate and 
efficacy of treatment were not associated with any of the 4 dependent variables and were hence not tabulated.
ORU = Univariate odds ratio.
ORm = Odds ratios obtained from multivariate stepwise logistic regression using univariately significant (including marginally significant) variables as 
candidate variables.
~ 0.5 < p < 0.1; *p < 0.5; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.
ns = not significant.
--- univariately non-significant and was not considered in the multivariate stepwise logistic regression analysis.
Table 5: Factors associated with anticipated preventive behaviors to protect others if 2 to 3 new human-to-human H5N1 cases were to 
be reported in Hong Kong (Continued)Page 9 of 12
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any quarantine policies, dissemination of information
about its efficacy may be useful. Single respondents were
less likely to comply fully with quarantine policies are also
generally more mobile. These people may have less sup-
port if quarantined, and this should be considered by pol-
icy makers.
From 2003 until the present, the reported fatality rate of
avian influenza in human has been over 50% [22], which
is markedly higher than the 9.6% case fatality of rate SARS
[23]. However, only about 40% of the study's respondents
considered human-to-human H5N1 fatality rate to be
higher than that of SARS. Hence, the actual magnitude of
behavioral responses might be even stronger, since we
found perceived fatality to be significantly associated with
self-protective behaviors. It is particularly interesting to
note that while associations with self-protective behaviors
such as mask use and handwashing were highly signifi-
cant, perceived fatality rate in comparison to SARS was
not significantly associated with any of the 4 behaviors
directed to protecting others. Therefore, different consid-
erations may be involved in making decisions of whether
to practice preventive behaviors, depending on whether
such behaviors are self-directed or directed towards oth-
ers.
With full population compliance with quarantine poli-
cies, the critical battle front of the avian influenza epi-
demic would shift to effective hospital infection control.
It is unlikely that health care workers will be able to com-
ply to all the stringent occupational guidelines in the
event of nosocomial human H5N1 outbreaks. High fatal-
ity rates may occur in these health settings if panic or
widespread non-adherence to safety measures occur.
Research, counseling and emergency plans are essential to
ensure that front-line health care workers are psychologi-
cally prepared and that the operations of health systems
will not be disrupted.
The public regarded older people, children, health care
workers and food vendors as particularly at risk of con-
tracting the virus. During the SARS epidemic, it was
reported that discriminatory attitudes have been
expressed toward some at-risk groups, such as health
workers [24,25]. It is worth noting that certain social
groups, such as health care workers or food vendors, may
be stigmatized similarly during an H5N1 influenza. Pre-
venting or minimizing this should thus be focus of future
study.
Approximately one-quarter of the respondents believed
that they or their family members would likely/very likely
be affected by an H5N1 outbreak whereas approximately
one-third of the respondents believed this to be true for
the general population. It was reported that during the
SARS epidemic, the general public worried about them-
selves or their family members' contracting the virus [13].
This is expected to be repeated if a human-to-human
avian flu outbreak occurs. These perceptions were also
associated with anticipated preventive behaviors. Many
studies have documented severe distress in the commu-
nity during and after the SARS epidemic [11,13] and
attention should be given in reduce panic at times of a
human-to-human H5N1 outbreak. With the potentially
high fatality and infectivity, high level of distress in the
public is expected.
Although prevalence of health-seeking behaviors are usu-
ally higher among females than males, gender was not
associated with any of the studied behaviors in this study.
The health threat in this case may have overridden the
aforementioned gender differentials. Education level was
not associated with self-directed preventive behaviors but
was associated with one of the others-directed preventive
behaviors. It is possible that altruism is associated with
education level. The reverse was true with age. Another
study indicated that higher age was associated with the
more use of preventive measures [26].
In general, factors related to perceived susceptibility, per-
ceived clinical severity of outcomes (e.g. fatality rate, per-
ceived availability and efficacy of treatments) were
associated with anticipated preventive behaviors. Such
variables are the key factors prescribed by the Health
Belief Model (HBM), which stated that adoption of health
behaviors is a function of an individual's attitudes and
beliefs about the health issue/behavior of concern [27].
These variables were significant in predicting preventive
behaviors related to SARS and influenza [9,12,13]. The
HBM is therefore applicable to understanding behaviors
for preventing the spread of emerging infectious diseases.
The study has a number of limitations. First, the study was
conducted using telephone surveys and some households
may not have been included. In Hong Kong, however,
almost all households have telephones [28] and a large
number of local published studies on SARS [11] and avian
influenza [11,13,14] have utilized this method. Second,
the response rate of the study was not very high. Neverthe-
less, the response rate was similar to many of other pub-
lished local studies [14,28,29]. with the distributions of
18–39 and 40–60 year age groups being very comparable
to those obtained from the Census data (49.6% and
50.4%, respectively). The study's gender distribution was
also comparable to the Census distributions (47.8% male
and 52.0% female) [30]. Adoption of behavioral
responses was self-reported and had not been validated.
However, during this pre-outbreak stage, it is unlikely thatPage 10 of 12
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behaviors.
While the results of this study may have meaningful
regional policy implications, caution should be given
when generalizing the results of this study to other coun-
tries. It is less clear whether populations which were rela-
tively unaffected by SARS and populations that
demonstrated less frequent face mask use and other rele-
vant public health measures would exhibit the same mag-
nitude of intended behavioral responses as the
population of Hong Kong. Cultural and perceptions fac-
tors (such as perceived efficacy of prevention means)
would also result in different prevalence of behavioral
responses. International comparisons are therefore also
greatly warranted.
Conclusion
In the event of a human-to-human H5N1 outbreak, the
Hong Kong public is very likely to adopt strong preventive
measures in order to protect themselves and others. The
magnitude of these behavioral responses may be even
greater than those witnessed during the SARS epidemic
and would be likely to increase if a high fatality rate or
high infectivity rate were reported. These preventive
behaviors may be an effective firewall to the continued
spread of the virus in the community. Surveillance of pub-
lic responses is an integral part of the government's H5N1
preparedness plan. It should address issues related to the
potentially underestimated fatality associated with
human H5N1 cases. Surveillance should also closely
monitor prevalence of important public health behaviors
such as quarantine compliance and cross-border preven-
tive measures. Up-to-date surveillance information is nec-
essary for the government to implement and make rapid
adjustments these public health measures.
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